page loader

The following article appeared in Pearls and Irritations on 12 Jan 2022.

It gives me no pleasure to write this article.

There was a time when Australian diplomacy was respected internationally; that period was from 1972 – 1996. It was a time in which Australia displayed diplomatic creativity and originality.

After the debacle and military failure of Vietnam, Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, put the American Alliance into perspective. In 1972 he forged an independent and close relationship with China, ahead of the United States, and built a diplomatic bridge to near neighbours in South East Asia. He shrank the relationship with England moving away from the forelock tugging of former Liberal Prime Minister Menzies and his three successors.

He put into effect Australian opposition to the racial outrage of apartheid, established new diplomatic missions in Asia, Africa and the Pacific and at international fora required the Department of Foreign Affairs to present an open and engaging presence with concern for human rights. Australia became active and contributed constructively to matters relating to the Antarctic, Law of the Sea, Nuclear Proliferation and the rights of newly emerging states.

However, Whitlam failed to protect the rights of the East Timorese in 1975 when they sought independence and the Department of Foreign Affairs did not present a case in support.  It was a failure that bedevilled the bi-lateral relationship with Indonesia for 24 years.

Nonetheless throughout the period of the Prime Ministerships of Fraser, Hawke and Keating Australia conducted an independent foreign policy, particularly toward China, Japan, our near neighbours, the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and limiting the spread of chemical weapons and land mines, to the irritation of the US.

Whitlam’s attempt to contain the United States capacity to constrain the parameters of Australian foreign policy through the operation of its secret spy base, Pine Gap, in the Northern Territory, resulted in his dismissal in 1975. The Governor General was influenced, through the crown, by the CIA and MI6. This had the effect of constraining, through caution and self-censorship, the development of bold foreign policy initiatives, which might have allowed Australia to carve out a place for itself as a non-aligned, independent middle power.

Despite the ever-present threat of the American elephant entering the room, the Department of Foreign Affairs, strengthened the staffing of overseas missions, conducted an extensive program of language training and other skills enhancement including technical and management training, improved the content and speed of information into the Department from posts and other sources and analysis, so important to the efficient functioning of the Department and decision making of government.

The Department of Foreign Affairs, the Diplomatic Corps and Diplomats in the field are only as good as the leadership provided by politicians and the political process. Australian diplomacy started to decline under the Prime Ministership of John Howard, who ditched any semblance of original policy making particularly with respect to international relations and defence.

From the time of his election in 1996 Howard moved resolutely back to the foreign policy settings of Menzies. He asserted the primacy of the United States Alliance as the most important aspect of Australian foreign policy. Howard was quick to volunteer Australian troops to fight in the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, just as Menzies had been with respect to the American war in Viet Nam. Howard ditched much of what had been learnt and achieved by Australia in terms of foreign relations. He reactivated the white Australia policy with cruel and unconscionable policies toward refugees and the Islamic community, much to the consternation of our neighbours.

He redefined foreign policy in terms of trade, war and defence. Money and jingoistic notions of security drove Australian foreign policy. Human rights were sneered at and friends in the Pacific were treated as losers and a burden.

At the same time, he politicised the public service, directly intervening or applying pressure with respect to senior appointments. Political loyalty trumped ability and experience. The change soon affected the middle ranks of the public service, fearless and honest advice became a thing of the past, as the nation witnessed with the Tampa affair, children overboard, refugees detained in concentration camps. It was an evil policy and an indicator of worse to come.

To an extent what also made this possible was a collective failure of moral courage and this continues to the present day.

Attempting to work within Howard’s flawed political framework DFAT struggled. There may have been some who opposed Australian participation in Afghanistan and Iraq, but career choices were narrowed to acceptance and stay or opposition and departure. It must have been difficult for diplomats at the Australian High Commission in Colombo not to report the genocide carried out against Tamils in the north of Sri Lanka in order to provide the Australian Government with deniability and thereby cover for not granting Tamil’s refugee status. It meant the government could ‘legally’ turn back boats and send home Tamils who were in Australia.

Not all DFAT officers were reluctant participants in this process. I am aware of some who actively participated and in so doing secured preferment, promotion and postings.

As a former diplomat Downer was a disaster as Foreign Minister. He thought, wrongly, that he knew more about international relations than anyone in his department. He and Howard were reluctant to intervene in East Timor, listening to Greg Sheridan of The Australian. They were scared of Indonesia. They only did so because of the strength of public opinion. But it left them angry. So much so, that they authorised the bugging of the East Timorese cabinet office to gain advantage in negotiations over the sea bed boundary which would determine access to oil and gas reserves.

It is not yet known who in DFAT knew of this plan, but it was carried out by the Australian spy agency, ASIS, so it is fair to assume some senior officers were aware. It was another low point in Australian diplomacy, bravely called out by Witness K and Bernard Collaery who the LNP are currently trying to crucify on behalf of those caught out.

Increasingly Australia has followed United States voting at the UN and in the process undoing carefully constructed and balanced foreign policy particularly with respect to the middle east and Israel.

Stephen Smith and Kevin Rudd, as foreign ministers, did not distinguish themselves on the question of Tamil refugees and Rudd did not prove as adroit in managing international relations as his former profession as a diplomat might have foreshadowed, particularly with respect to China and Indonesia.  Bob Carr had a grasp of the middle east and China but failed with Tamil refugees. He worked well with his department. Julie Bishop was a foreign policy lightweight and her successor, Marise Payne, more so.

Without consistent leadership the department has drifted. Perversely senior officers have been praised for overseeing Australia’s biggest foreign policy disaster since WWII – the collapse of the relationship with China. In July 2021 Kathryn Campbell, AO, CSC, was appointed to replace Frances Adamson, AO. Campbell is a Major General in the army reserve. She has no experience in foreign policy. Under the Morrison government foreign policy has become increasingly militarised, perhaps Campbell was seen as a useful asset in this new framework.

The Australian Security Policy Institute (ASPI), funded by US arms manufacturers, US government and Australian government has moved under Morrison to occupy a position of primary adviser to government on foreign policy and defence matters. It has adopted a hard-line approach toward China and advocates military support for Taiwan. It is opening an office in Washington which will poach much of the work undertaken by the Embassy. It has marginalised DFAT and has a strong policy input with Defence. It has the ear of Morrison and Dutton; Payne has been marginalised.

It no doubt had influence in the cancellation of the French submarine contract and adoption of the unbalanced AUKUS agreement; Australian sovereignty and strategic interests will be undermined.

Since the Cold War, US military and diplomatic interests have been interwoven. The US operates on the basis that its military strength provides diplomatic leverage and reinforces negotiations. As a result of lobbying by the State Department and ASPI, Morrison is going down the same path. He appears to have accepted that Australian foreign policy will be shaped and driven by defence priorities and considerations. AUKUS is a case in point. When fully implemented it will see the militarisation of northern Australian with US assets directed against China. Pine Gap is being expanded to take account of the enhanced surveillance requirements this posture will require.

Morrison has not bothered to negotiate with China to reverse their trade sanctions. He appears to believe with the US at his back and with enhanced Australian defence assets he can bully to bring about change in the relationship. Never mind that the US has stepped in and helped itself to some of Australia’s lost market. Morrison has sought a strengthened Five Eyes and militarise the Quad. In recent months he has strengthened military ties with South Korea and Japan and his conversations with Modi have been about strategic concerns.

On other major diplomatic issues such as climate change, Morrison has shown no interest and in fact made a fool of himself at Glasgow. He has also shown little interest or understanding in trade. Through the influence of ASPI and his own inclinations Morrison has ceded formulation of Australian international and defence relations to Washington, aided by the absence of moral courage, pride and vision in government and politicisation of the public service.

Morrison has sold out; Australian has forfeited sovereignty. Our ability to forge independent policy and relationships has been considerably constrained.

Bruce Haigh is a political commentator and retired Diplomat.

The attached appeared in Pearls and Irritations on 29 December 2021.

Covid19 provided cover for an increasingly disorderly retreat by Australia from Asia. It provided a face-saving excuse to creep home behind the protective shield of AUKUS and the United States, our ally through thick and thin over the last eighty years and the only country in the world we trust.

Our first foray into Asia was to send a military contingent to support Britain and other colonising powers put down an anti-imperialist armed uprising by Chinese nationalists. The revolt was known as the Boxer Rebellion and took place from 1899-1901. Australian colonies sent just under 1000 men, primarily from NSW and Victoria. Australian troops were already engaged with the British in putting down another colonial uprising in South Africa. The contingent was initially garrisoned in Tianjin and then formed part of the force which sacked Beijing. They served in China from August 1900 to March 1901.

No doubt the drive for volunteers was assisted by the anti-Asian campaign run by Australian newspapers, in particular The Bulletin, in the closing years of the Nineteenth Century. It led to the White Australia policy and a turning away from Asia with the exception of the British colonial cities of Hong Kong, Singapore and Rangoon.

Anti-Chinese sentiment had seen most Chinese gold miners driven from the gold fields in the late 1850’s and 1860’s with many returning to their place of birth. Some stayed and took up or continued with various commercial pursuits in regional NSW and Victoria. They were tolerated for as long as their number remained small. Many were assimilated through marriage.

White Australia remained apprehensive or fearful of a seaborn Asian invasion. This primal emotion remains to this day. The solution for the newly federated nation was to ignore this ‘threat’ and to have as little to do with Asia as possible. It punished and impeded any Asian who sought to permanently enter Australia with impossible language tests.

The new Australia fixed its gaze and shipping routes on Great Britain, referred to by many of the transplanted whites as home, and also white, English speaking, South Africa, New Zealand and Canada and to a lesser extent America.

Australia was quick to volunteer for Britain’s European war in 1914 and again in 1939. The British and American defeat in Asia was underlined for Australia with the Japanese advance to within 32 kilometres of Port Moresby. The fears of white Australia were placated with Japanese withdrawals in the Pacific in 1944. Hostility and the desire to punish the Japanese rested easily with many, if not the majority of Australians for some time after the war, much to the hurt and pain of Japanese war brides.

Hatred of the Japanese morphed into hatred of the North Koreans and then Chinese with the advent of the Korean war in 1950. Comic book illustrators moved seamlessly from drawing ugly myopic Japanese soldiers to drawing ugly myopic Chinese and North Koreans. And with incredible dexterity and skill they were able to draw very handsome and wholesome South Korean soldiers who looked nothing like their North Korean counterparts and cousins.

Trade softened many in Australia toward Japan particularly the arrival of reliable and relatively cheap Japanese cars and the sale of wheat, coal and iron ore. Tourists followed and Sydney and the Gold Coast developed a new song sheet. In the meantime, well healed Australians discovered the delights of Singapore, Hong Kong, Manila, Bangkok and later Bali, although some didn’t know they were in Asia, far less Indonesia.

The Colombo Plan brought people from the region, providing some exposure to Asia, albeit limited, for Australians in academia and business. The Malayan Emergency and Sukarno’s Konfrontasi, kept the region on the pages of Australian newspapers. Australia established an RAAF base at Butterworth, Malaya, at this time. News of the comings and goings at the base also served to keep Asia in the media.

China was an ever present although secondary news item, focusing mainly negative attention. The Great Leap Forward, 1958-62 was viewed with bemusement and the Cultural Revolution beginning in 1966 and lasting ten years until Mao’s death,with concern. But for Australians what was happening in China and the distorted view that gave them of ‘Asia’ was soon overshadowed by the war in Vietnam and Australia’s involvement on the side of the United States.

At first the focus on the part of the media was low key, featuring stories on page five or six. However, with Conscripts going into the army in 1965, the tabloids had front page stories of haircuts and farewells. The visit of US President, Lydon Johnson to Australia in October 1966 saw the first of the major demonstrations against the war. Conscription galvanised mothers and those likely to be called up and the increasing horror and human cost of the war motivated the Left, the Labor Party and then a broad spectrum of the population. By late 1967 early 1968 television footage out of Vietnam had a marked effect on public opinion. Cartoonist, Bruce Petty, was cutting, clever and relentless in his criticism of the US prosecution of the war, soon enough cartoonists of the right, like Molnar and Collette accepted defeat. Petty was a significant mobiliser of public opinion.

The war in Vietnam changed Australian perceptions and understandings toward Asia. The Right in Australia wanted retribution and destruction visited upon the North Vietnamese. They wanted Asia and Asians punished for causing Western nations problems. The attitude of the Right has not changed. Pol Pot and the killing fields only reinforced their prejudices. The perceptions of the Right toward Asia infiltrated into the broader Australian consciousness, from there into politics, through people like Pauline Hanson and John Howard and into the main stream media.

The Left was devastated by the war and the perceptions generated toward Asia because of it. The Vietnam war forced a focus on the region including Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. Despite the horror, curiosity was aroused, particularly toward Thailand and many Australians broke their journeys to and from Europe in Bangkok or Singapore. That was how Australians viewed Asia in the 60’s and 70’s, as a stop over to somewhere else. A fact noted by Keating. SEATO didn’t cut much ice with Australians, nor any of the many and varied regional conferences which took place.

The Australian focus on Asia changed with the election of Gough Whitlam in December 1972. Amongst the first of many major decisions Whitlam recognised China. He had earlier paid a visit as leader of the Opposition in 1971. This decision completely changed the vision in Australia toward Asia. Stephen Fitzgerald was appointed Australia’s first Ambassador to Beijing. Trade and cultural exchanges flourished. Embassies were opened or expanded in all the countries of Asia, the Pacific and Africa. Australia came out from behind the Union Jack and embraced the world with confidence and enthusiasm.

DFAT and other government departments undertook extensive Asian language training programs and as embassies opened and expanded Australian businesses followed, also engaging in language and cultural training. Universities offered courses and schools language training. French, German, Italian, Greek and Latin got a firm nudge sideways. Asia not Europe was the focus. Australians stopped in Asia for lengthier holidays and visited exotic places such as Angkor Wat and Borobudur. People learnt enough phrases to be polite toward hotel staff, taxi drivers and at markets. They enjoyed Asia and Asia enjoyed them.

Whilst China was seen as important, it did not have the economic and political clout it now enjoys. Japan in the 1970’s was coming to dominate the region. Amongst those who made a significant contribution to the relationship was John Menadue, who was appointed Ambassador to Japan in 1976. He served in that capacity until 1980 overseeing a significant growth in trade and tourism. The two countries discovered each other and, in the process, developed a mutually beneficial relationship. Menadue was as significant in developing the relationship with Japan as Fitzgerald had been with China.

For twenty-five years Australia had a strong engagement with the region. Australian universities developed off shore campuses, Australian businesses established themselves in various capitals including Shanghai and Hong Kong. The only major company to receive a significant set back was News Corporation in China. This happened because of arrogance and ineptness. The Australian relationship with an increasingly self-confident and wealthy China grew, both sides expressed a great deal of satisfaction with this development.

The first warning sign that things might change came with the election of the Howard government in 1996. Elected at the same time was Pauline Hanson, a brash and unsophisticated racist from Queensland. In her maiden speech she declared that ‘Australia was in danger of being swamped by Asians.’ These remarks were widely reported particularly in Asia, where many Australian heads of mission were asked to explain. Howard did not immediately slap Hanson down. He let it fester and rot for two years before he addressed her remarks, but by then it was too late the damage had been done.

Whitlam, Fraser, Hawke and Keating worked hard to keep the Australian racist genie in the bottle, Howard let it go thinking it might help him electorally, and it may have, but it gave licence to Australian bigots and watchful concern to friends in the region. Howard’s treatment of refugees did not go unnoticed, from remote desert detention centres to Children Overboard he gradually rebuilt White Australia. Attacks against Indian students by white vigilantes in Melbourne and Sydney was an indicator of what Howard had sown and taken root. Howard did not nurture relationships in Asia for him the UK and the US were far more important. He chose to ignore what Percy Spender and Paul Keating stressed, ‘that no country can afford to ignore it’s geography.’ Howard was a racist, it showed and was noticed. Abbott and Morrison followed in his footsteps, Morrison disastrously so.

Feeding Howard’s racism and that of most members of his party was an inward-looking Jingoism, fed by casualties from Iraq and Afghanistan, which had returning bodies met with ceremony, by Howard and defence chiefs and an overplayed celebration of the ‘Anzac tradition’ and the myth of mateship in the run up to the centenary celebrations of WW1. Jingoism, Anzac and mateship all fed the narrative of white supremacy. These appeals to patriotism looked inward, with the effect of further turning Australia’s collective back on Asia.

Under Murdoch the pressure of his relentlessly biased reporting affected other Australian media outlets and government, which gradually saw focus shift from giving readers and viewers a world perspective to one where the US and UK shared primacy.

Even before Trump became President the United States was girding its loins to take on competition from China, which it described as a threat. Trade and economic rivalry were transformed into a security threat, which gave the US many more levers and tools with which to attempt to contain China. Then Trump came along and with ignorance and insularity sustained by a simplistic and mean-spirited world view he imposed sanctions on China and ramped up hostile rhetoric. Sensing someone equally as uncomfortable with syllogisms as himself, Trump turned the sycophantic Morrison into a croaking swamp toad and wound him up to pour a bucket on Xi Jinping over the origin of Covid. Morrison in his schoolboy bully style told the world it was Wuhan and the virus had escaped from a laboratory, located in a wet market.

Xi was livid. China imposed restrictions on a range of imports amounting to $35 billion. Covid hastened the fall in numbers of Chinese students and tourists. We should have seen it coming. Morrison is a product of Howard’s racism and quest for material wealth at the expense of all else. From the time Abbott became Prime Minister whatever lingering tolerance remained toward Asia was evaporating. His creation of Bunyip knights and dames and treatment of refugees and Indigenous Australians indicated to the region where he was coming from.

From 2017 the relationship with China began to cool. The main stream media became obsessed with allegations of Chinese cyber attacks and infiltration of student organisations. In 2018 academic, Clive Hamilton, published a book, ‘Silent Invasion’, alleging growing CPC influence in Australia and in 2019, the Australian government banned Huawei from the 5G network and lobbied Five Eyes against any association. China was furious.

The Morrison imbroglio will not be sorted until he is no longer in power. I understand the Chinese will have nothing to do with him. They know him and do not like him. They have probably heard enough with the means available to them to know that both Dutton and Morrison are arrogant, unreconstituted racists.

Coming stridently on the scene at this time was the so-called independent think tank the Australia Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), which is not very independent with funding from US arms manufacturers, the US Embassy and the Australian government. ASPI has the ear of Dutton, Morrison and Payne, it is stridently anti-Chinese, it advocates a much closer defence relationship with the US and has been a strong supporter of all the chatter surrounding AUKUS and the ‘acquisition’ by Australia of as yet to be developed US nuclear powered submarines. The prospect of which makes many countries within the region uneasy or annoyed.

Australia’s exit from Asia is all but accomplished with its adoption of US policy toward China. This denies the primacy China enjoys in the region and acknowledgement of the dominant role it will play throughout the Pacific and indeed the world in the near future. Australia has made a very bad and costly call.